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Changes in Job Structure and Rising Wage Inequality 
in Urban China, 1995-2007 
 
We use household surveys from 1995, 2002, and 2007 to examine how changes in job 
structure contributed to China’s rising urban wage inequality, considering three job 
characteristics: occupation, industry, and firm ownership. The explanatory power of job 
structure for wage inequality increased between 1995 and 2007. Both the change in relative 
number of jobs (composition effect) and the change in between-job and within-job wage gaps 
(price effect) contributed to rising wage inequality. Price effect was the major contributor, 
whereas composition effect played a larger role in the 1995-2002 period than in the 2002-
2007 period, and at the lower-half distribution. Between-job inequality played a major role in 
the first period, and within-job inequality played a major role in the second period. Our results 
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 1  Introduction
Along with the rapidly growing economy, China’s urban wage inequality continuously 
increased in the last two decades (Meng et al., 2010). Higher inequality creates incentive for 
individuals to invest more in human capital (education and training, for example) and to work 
harder. Wage inequality may also encourage destructive behavior (crime, for example) and 
cause social instability. Predicting the possible consequences of rising  wage inequality and 
curing its adverse effects require a good understanding of the factors behind wage inequality. 
There is a substantial literature analyzing  changes in China’s urban wage structure (Knight 
and Song, 2003, 2008; Meng et al., 2010; Liu et al., 2010). This paper explores the role of job 
structures in urban wage inequality and provides an understanding of the channels through 
which  various  factors  have  affected  inequality,  considering  three  dimensions  of  job 
heterogeneity: occupation, industry, and ownership. 
There  are  many  reasons  job-related  wage  differentials  exist.  Jobs  of  different 
occupations and/or industries may be paid differently because they require specific skills that 
may or  may not  be  related  to  education  and  experience  (Autor  et al.,  2003;  Goos  and 
Manning, 2007).1 Different working conditions and institutional arrangements can also create 
occupation  and  industry  wage  gaps  (Weeden,  2002).  In  China,  workers  in  different 
ownerships face different compensation mechanisms and are often paid differently (Dong and 
Bowles, 2002; Xing, 2008). Finally, there is wage inequality within jobs as well, and the 
wage gap may vary across jobs because of different distributions of unobserved skills and 
different compensation mechanisms.
The three dimensions of job heterogeneity (occupation, industry, and ownership) reflect 
2
1  See Goos et al. (2009) and Autor et al. (2006) for more recent empirical evidence. different forces behind wage inequality. Occupation structure and industry adjustment, to a 
larger  extent,  reflect  the  force  of  technological  change,  while  ownership  restructuring 
displays more of  the effect of economic  reforms. Because these  three aspects were often 
intertwined in  China’s transitional  process, we  define  each occupation/industry/ownership 
cell as one job type.
Wage  gaps  between  and  within  jobs  were  small  under  China’s  traditional  planning 
system. The transition process, including ownership restructuring and globalization, not only 
made wage determination more market-oriented, but also facilitated labor reallocations across 
jobs. A rapid technological  progress, which  also  had a  fundamental influence on  the  job 
structure  by  replacing  routine  human  task  and  increasing  demand  for  non-routine  task, 
accompanied this process. Therefore, investigating detailed changes in the job structure and 
their contributions to rising  wage inequality will provide a more nuanced understanding of 
how economic and technological forces affected China’s inequality, and help us assess their 
relative importance.
Analyzing  urban household surveys from  1995, 2002, and  2007, we find  substantial 
labor  reallocations  among  jobs  between  1995 and  2007,  with workers  moving  from  the 
manufacturing  sector to  the  service  sector  and from  the  public  sector  to the  private. The 
results also  suggest rapidly increasing  wage  differentials  between  jobs  in  the  1995-2007 
period, with managerial and professional jobs earning more than other jobs in 2007 than in 
2002 and 1995, and wage gaps between public and non-public sectors increasing significantly 
by 2007. Quantile regression results indicate that within-job inequalities for different types of 
jobs  were  significantly  different,  and  the  differential  pattern  changed  over  time. 
Correspondingly,  the  explanatory power  of  job  structure  for  wage  inequalities  increased 
between 1995 and 2007. 
3Finally, we use the reweighting approach developed by DiNardo, Fortin, and Lemieux 
(1996, hereinafter DFL) to decompose the change in wage inequality into price effect (due to 
changes in relative wages between and within jobs) and composition effect (due to changes in 
relative shares of different jobs). Both effects were important contributors to the rising wage 
inequality, with price effect being relatively more important. Relatively speaking, however, 
composition effect played a larger role in the 1995-2002 period and was more prevalent at the 
lower-half wage distribution. Between-job inequality played a larger role in the 1995-2002 
period, while within-job inequality played a greater role in the 2002-2007 period. 
All results in this paper indicate an important role played by job structure in mediating 
the influence of technological progress and institutional reforms on the labor market. These 
results also have major policy implications, which will be discussed later. 
This paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature. Section 3 introduces the 
data and describes how the labor force has been reallocated among jobs over time. Section 4 
first examines the  explanatory power  of  job characteristics for wage inequality over time 
using  Fields decomposition (Fields, 2004), and then uses quantile  regression technique  to 
investigate changes in relative inequality within  jobs. The contribution  of  job structure  to 
wage inequality is then decomposed into price and composition effects. Section 5 concludes 
and provides policy implications. 
2  Literature Review
Recently, economists and sociologists began to explore the relationship between  job 
structure and wage inequality. The literature has found evidence, although mixed, that job 
structure  may  influence  wage  inequality  through  changes  in  three  aspects:  between-job 
inequality (Mouw and Kalleberg, 2010), within-job inequality (Kim and Sakamoto, 2008), 
4and job composition, or polarization effect (Autor et al., 2003; Goos and Manning, 2007; 
Goos et al., 2009; Autor et al., 2006). 
Goos and Manning (2007) argue that technological progress will raise relative demand 
in well-paid skilled jobs (professional and managerial jobs, for example) and in low-paid 
unskilled  jobs,  and  reduce  the  relative  demand  in  “middle”  jobs.  The  reason  is  that 
technology can  easily replace  “middle”  jobs involving  routine  tasks,  but  cannot replace 
human labor in non-routine (both highly skilled and manual) tasks (Autor et al., 2003). We 
conclude from these  studies that job structure is an essential channel through which basic 
technological  forces  influence  the  labor  market. Although the  above  researches  were  on 
western countries: US, UK, and other OECD countries, our paper belongs to this literature 
but in the context of transitional China, where institutional features also play a big role.
Our paper also reflects a growing literature on the wage structure of urban China, but the 
most  extensively  studied  issue  seems  to  be  the  relationship  between  wage  levels  and 
education and experience, based on the seminal work of Mincer (1974).  Basic findings show 
that the returns to education (or skill prices) for urban China  have increased continuously 
since the late 1980s (Zhang et al., 2005), and that the rising skill prices could explain most of 
the increase in wage inequality (Li et al., 2007). Studies are also trying  to uncover factors 
behind the skill prices (Liu et al., 2010), but the attention paid to job structure is inadequate. 
As job choices are often correlated with human capital levels, the increase in skill prices may 
take the form of increased wage differentials between jobs.
As mentioned in the  introduction, job structure may influence wage  levels and wage 
inequality even after controlling  for general skill levels. It is not an uncommon practice in 
researches  to  control  for  occupation,  industry,  and/or  ownerships when  examining  wage 
5determination, but more often, these characteristics are auxiliary control variables, and how 
these characteristics affect wages is seldom reported. 
With the enlargement of the private  sector in the urban sector since the  early 1990s, 
more  workers  were  paid  according  to  their  performance  and  unobserved  (at  least  to 
researchers)  skills.  Even  in  public  sectors,  employees  were  increasingly paid  based  on 
performance in recent years. Consequently, within-job inequalities might be a factor behind 
the wage inequality increase that occurred when skill prices increased. However, the research 
on within-job inequalities’ contribution to rising wage inequality is still scarce, Knight and 
Song (2008) being an exception. They used quantile regression to examine relative within-
group inequalities and their  changes between  1995 and  2002,  and found  that unobserved 
characteristics “appear to fetch a higher market price.” 
Knight and Song  (2008)  also found  that occupation  played an  important role  in the 
increasing wage inequality between 1995 and 2002. We go one step further in decomposing 
the effect of changing job structure into price effect and composition effect, the price effect 
being further decomposed into within-job and between-job effects. This approach has not yet 
been investigated in the literature. 
One small literature that pays particular attention to job structure is that of researches on 
gender income gap. There are a few studies emphasizing occupational segmentation in China 
(Meng  and  Miller,  1995; Meng,  1998;  Meng  and Zhang,  2001  for  instance),  but gender 
income gap literature directly exploring the relationship between job structure and inequality 
is rare.
3  Data
We use data from China Household Income Project (CHIP) surveys for 1995, 2002, and 
62007 to examine the effect of job structure change on wage inequality. In using  the CHIP 
data, we gather information on observations aged 18-60. The CHIP data is known for its high 
quality and national representativeness. In 1995 and 2002, the survey collected information in 
Beijing, Shanxi, Liaoning, Jiangsu, Anhui, Henan, Hubei, Guangdong, Sichuan, Chongqing,2 
Yunnan, and Gansu. More provinces (Shanghai, Zhejiang, Fujian, and Hunan) were included 
in the 2007 survey, but they were not included in our analysis for the sake of comparability. 
Table 8 in the Appendix shows the regional distribution of observation numbers and the 
economic  structure  in each region. In 1995, 2002, and 2007, 37%, 39%, and 42% of the 
observations were distributed in eastern areas, respectively, showing  agglomeration of the 
labor  force  in  those  regions  and  that  these  regions  outperformed  hinterland  China. The 
economic structures were also different, with the east having  a larger share of the tertiary 
industry. Although regional inequality is an important dimension, a full study of this topic is 
beyond the scope of this paper. Instead, we control for province dummies in most of our 
regressions to account for regional variation; thus, the results can be assessed as the average 
across regions.
Because  the  sampling  process  of  these  surveys  was  based  on  formal  residence 
registration  (hukou),  the  data  we  use  exclude  most  migrant  households  without  formal 
residence permits in urban areas. Considering  the large amount of rural-to-urban migrants 
(Cai et al., 2009), and that they are usually worse off than urban local workers (Démurger et 
al.,  2009),  our  data  may  produce  biased  urban  inequality;  however,  by  focusing  on  a 
subsample with urban hukou, there is less need to consider the monetary value of hukou. If, 
instead, both native and migrant workers were considered, neglecting hukou value would bias 
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2 Chongqing was a city of the Sichuan province before 1997; after 1997 it became a direct-control city.urban inequality because several benefits come with hukou status.3 Due to the lack of data on 
migration and the complication of hukou value, it is difficult to assess to what extent our data 
bias urban inequality. The findings in this paper should therefore be interpreted with these 
caveats in mind.
This  paper  choosing  to  analyze  annual  rather  than  hourly  wage  also  merits  some 
discussion. The  surveys in 1995  and 2002 collected working  time  information. Summary 
statistics of working  time  for these years, shown in Table 9 in the Appendix, suggest that 
workers in 2002 worked longer than those in 1995. There are also variations in working time 
across jobs, but the differentials are not large. Unfortunately, the data for 2007 do not have 
working time; therefore, we use annual wages in our paper. 
Another reason for using annual wages is that some labor income may only come to the 
worker at the end of a year (for example, a bonus). The wage data in the CHIP include two 
parts: regular wages and “other labor income.” The latter part includes bonus and subsidies. 
Overtime and other compensations are accounted for as long as they are “labor income” and 
the  wage data were not top-coded. All wages are deflated to 1995 RMB prices using  the 
national CPI. 
As mentioned, job categories  are  defined  based  on occupational  type,  industry,  and 
ownership. There  are  six  occupation  types:  managerial  (head  or unit head), professional, 
ordinary staff, unskilled worker, skilled worker, and other. These occupations are distributed 
in 13 industries. Workers can also be  in different ownerships: state-owned enterprises (or 
SOEs), collective enterprises, and other ownerships. Other ownerships, hereafter referred to 
as “private sector,” include joint-owned enterprises, foreign enterprises, and private firms; 
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3 The bias can be in either direction. One scenario is that people with urban local hukou have higher wages, possibly because 
of discrimination against migrant workers. On the other hand, people may accept lower wages because their urban hukou 
guarantees other benefits. For a more detailed discussion of China’s hukou system, see Fan (2008).therefore, the heterogeneity within this group is large. In particular, foreign firms may have 
higher productivity and pay higher wages. It would be ideal if we had enough observations 
for  workers in  such  firms;  unfortunately,  the  number  of  observations in  foreign or  joint 
ventures is small for 1995 and 2002,4 and we cannot identify such ownerships in the data for 
2007. Finally, we have 234 ownership-industry-occupation jobs. 
Table  1  reports  summary statistics.  Both  wage  level  and  wage  inequality increased 
between 1995 and 2007. Log annual wages increased from 8.53 in 1995 to 9.02 in 2002, and 
to 9.50 in 2007. Standard deviation increased from 0.69 in 1995 to 0.76 in 2002, and to 0.82 
in 2007. Inequality increased more on the upper half of wage distribution in the 2002-2007 
period. This pattern is also found in other researches (Xing, 2010).
(Insert Table 1 around here)
Significant changes in job composition accompanied the increase in wage inequality. 
For convenience, we look at three dimensions of job heterogeneity separately to see these 
changes.5 As for occupation, there are gradual decreases in managerial and professional jobs, 
while the share of ordinary staff increased dramatically between 2002 and 2007. In a period 
of rising  skill prices, these findings sound counterintuitive  and inconsistent with evidence 
from  developed  countries. This  may be  due  to  the  ambiguity of  occupation  definitions. 
Another possible reason is that the labor force was increasingly reallocated from SOEs to the 
private sector. The SOEs tend to be larger and more hierarchical, and therefore have more 
unit heads. There are also more rigid employee rankings based on seniority and/or education 
levels. In the private sector, however, more workers are likely to be classified as “ordinary 
9
4  See Table  10 of  the appendix.  Even with a small number of  observations in the  foreign sector,  we can tell that the 
manufacturing industry and the trade and commercial industry have relatively more workers in foreign firms.
5 Considering a full set of jobs (13*6*3=234 categories) requires a lot of space, and the payoff is marginal. In the Fields 
decomposition analysis later, we will consider a full set of job categories and the results are similar.staff.” 
Changes in industry composition provide a more accurate picture of the changing  job 
structure. In 1995, over 40% of the workforce was in the manufacturing industry. By 2007, 
this workforce declined to 20%. This is consistent with the  hypothesis that technological 
change can replace routine human tasks and complement non-routine human labor. Because 
work in the manufacturing industry involves a large amount of routine tasks, machines and 
computers,  with  the  rapid progress  of computer science  and  the  sharp price  decrease  in 
computing  tasks,  could  easily  replace  manufacturing  jobs.  Also  consistent  with  this 
hypothesis, the labor force was increasingly absorbed by the IT and service industry, where 
the tasks were not easy to replace by computers. The share of employees in the government 
also increased slightly. 
Associated  with  changes  in  job  structure,  education  levels  increased  as  well.  The 
average years of schooling increased from 10.8 in 1995 to 11.5 in 2002, and to 12.8 in 2007. 
The average years of experience for the workforce increased from 19.5 years in 1995 to 21.7 
in 2007.
4  Job Structure and Wage Inequality
4.1 Jobs and Wage Determination
We  estimate  wage  equations for  each  year to  see  the  changes in  between-job  wage 
differentials.6   Before  that,  we  estimate  wage  equations  controlling  only  for  years  of 
schooling,  experience,  experience  squared,  sex,  and  province  dummies.  The  first  three 
columns of Table  2 report these results. Each additional year of schooling  was associated 
10
6 We use OLS or quantile regressions to estimate wage equations, for which the omitted variable (ability) problem  is a 
textbook example of  an endogeneity problem; however, we do not endeavor to address this problem, mainly because our 
focus is to explain wage variations rather than to establish a causal relationship between two variables. Also, there is no 
consistent evidence showing that OLS estimates are systematically different from the estimates using IVs or other empirical 
strategies (Card, 1999). As a result, running OLS for wage equations seems to be an accepted practice in our profession (see 
Knight and Song, 2003, 2008; Meng et al., 2010; Lemieux, 2006; Lemieux et al., 2009, for examples). with a 5% increase in wages in 1995. This association increased to over 8% and nearly 12% 
in 2002 and 2007, respectively. Women earned significantly less than men did, and the gap 
enlarged significantly,  especially for the 2002-2007  period. As in  many other studies, the 
explanatory power of these variables is small (the adjusted R-squared are below 30%). 
(Insert Table 2 around here)
Columns 4-6 of  Table  2 report the results with  controls for  job  characteristics. The 
adjusted R-squared and the explanatory power of the model increased after adding job-related 
variables. The fact that the coefficients for education decrease in these results indicates that 
job characteristics are correlated with education. We thus explore the variations caused by job 
characteristics  holding  education  and  experience  constant;  that  is,  we  investigate  the 
inequalities caused by job characteristics for individuals with the same level of education.7
Coefficients for occupation dummies were negative, meaning  the managerial jobs (the 
omitted group in regression) received the highest pay in all three years. Professional jobs had 
the second highest pay. In 1995, the wage differential between managerial and professional 
jobs was insignificant. The unskilled workers had the lowest wage levels. 
Wage differentials between occupations increased in the latter two survey years. The 
managerial jobs began to have significantly higher wages than professional jobs and to earn 
higher than other jobs by a larger margin. The wages of ordinary staff were 12% lower than 
that for managerial positions in 1995. The gap increased to 16% in 2002 and to 18% in 2007. 
Meanwhile, the wage levels of unskilled workers were 26% lower than that for managerial 
positions, and it increased to around 40% lower in 2002 and 2007. The rising  gap between 
11
7 Another exercise we will do in “Decomposing Changes in Wage Inequality,” is decomposing residual wage inequality (the 
wage regressions are using log of  wage as dependent variable and education, experience, experience squared, gender, and 
province dummies). These exercises differentiate out the between-group variation due to education and experience.different occupations, again, reflects the influence of technological change as suggested by 
Goos and Manning (2007) and Autor et al. (2003): while computers easily replace ordinary 
staff  and  unskilled  workers,  managerial  jobs  or  professional  jobs  require  more  creative 
thinking  and  personal  skills,  skills whose  demand increases with  technological  progress. 
Furthermore, as the managerial and professional jobs are at the top of job ladders, and the 
“ordinary staff” or “ordinary workers” belong to the traditional “middle class,” changes in 
relative wages mean  that the  gaps in  the upper-half wage  distribution  will increase. This 
partially explains why the upper-half wage distribution increased more significantly in recent 
years.
These above forces were also at work in shaping the wage differentials across industries. 
Compared to the manufacturing industry (the omitted group), workers in high-tech industries 
earned higher wages, as did workers in finance and insurance industries. Service workers in 
the catering and restaurant industry earned lower wages. 
The  industry wage  differentials  evolved  over  time.  Workers  in  the  mining  industry 
earned significantly higher in 2007 than in previous years, which may be due to the rising 
demand for energy in recent years. Given the unhealthy working conditions and high risk of 
losing  lives  or  being  injured,  it seems  reasonable  that workers  with  the  same  personal 
characteristics demand higher wages to work in this industry. We also find that industries of 
health,  physical  culture,  social  welfare,  education,  culture,  and  arts  and  broadcasting 
(industry 7  and  8  in  Table  2)  had  much  higher  wages in  2002.  We  conjecture  that the 
education expansion in the late 1990s, which increased the demand for such services, might 
have caused the spikes in these industries. Another possible reason is that jobs were more 
secure in those industries and workers there did not suffer massive unemployment or layoff in 
the late 1990s ownership restructuring, at least compared to the manufacturing industry. After 
12some adjustment, both in these industries and manufacturing industries, the wage differentials 
tended to diminish by 2007. We admit,  however,  these  reasons are  speculative  and more 
concrete evidence is needed. 
Firm ownerships also have significant impact on wages. In all three years, workers in 
collective  sectors earned significantly lower than those  in the SOEs (the  omitted group), 
indicating a bifurcation within the public sector. Of special interest is the wage differential 
between the private  sector and  the  SOEs. In  1995,  the  private  sector had slightly higher 
wages than the SOEs, but the  difference was not significant. In 2002 and 2007, however, 
workers in the private sector earned significantly lower than workers in SOEs did, by about 
20% and 30%, respectively. This is a strong indication that the performance and the wage 
setting behavior had changed for the SOEs after the late 1990s ownership restructuring. 
Besides these changes in the public sector, the enlarging gap may also be due to the slow 
wage growth in the private sector. First, the late 1990s ownership restructuring created a large 
number of laid-off or unemployed workers, and the private sector absorbed the majority of 
these  workers.  Second,  urban  workers  in  the  private  sector  were  more  likely  to  face 
competition from rural-urban migrants, while workers in SOEs were more immune to such 
competitions.
The 1995 and 2002 surveys also collected position or ranking information about jobs. 
There  were  four levels in  professional  jobs:  ordinary technician  and  junior,  middle,  and 
senior  level  professionals.  There  were  also  four  parallel  levels  for  managerial  jobs. 
Employees with higher education levels and those in the public sector were more likely to be 
subject to this ranking  system. Employees with these titles (other than ordinary staff) had 
higher wages than those without (see columns 1 and 2 of Table 3). 
13(Insert Table 3 around here)
Not surprisingly, higher-level titles were associated with higher wages. Between 1995 
and 2002, the differential increased sharply. Columns 3 and 4 of Table 3 report the results 
employing  restricted samples retaining only employees with titles. Junior and middle level 
professional jobs earned 17% and 10% lower than the senior ones in 1995. By 2002, the gaps 
increased to 27% and 15%, respectively. Gaps along  the administrative track also enlarged 
during this period.
4.2 Contribution of Job Structure to Wage Inequality: Fields Decomposition
To  see the  contribution of  job structure  to wage  inequality, we decompose the  wage 
variation into various parts according to the following formulas (Fields, 2004):
                                                                                               (1)
                                                                                                          
 (2) 
where is the kth variable,  is the estimated coefficient for in wage equations, and is 
the predicted residual. The decomposition results are reported in Table 4. 
(Insert Table 4 around here)
Job structure played an important role in all three  years. In 1995, job structure could 
explain 7.4% of the variance in log wages, while region and experience explained 11.3% and 
8.3%, respectively. Job structure’s explanatory power reached 16.1% in 2002, becoming the 
most important in explaining the wage variation. It decreased to 12% in 2007, but maintained 
14the  highest explanatory power  among  all  factors.  Moreover,  different dimensions  of  job 
heterogeneity played different roles. Occupation type played a major role in 1995 and 2002, 
and  there  was  a  sharp increase  in  its  explanatory power  between  these  two  years. The 
contribution of ownership increased continuously, and by 2007, its explanatory power (5.4%) 
had surpassed that of occupation (4.8%). Industry played a relatively small role among these 
three dimensions. 
Along with the changes in the contribution of job structure to wage variations, that of 
other variables also changed. Education could explain only 2% of the wage variation in 1995.   
By 2002, its explanatory power reached 4.7%, and by 2007, 8.7%.  In other words, education 
contributed to increases in wage inequality. Gender also became an increasingly important 
contributor to wage inequality. The explanatory power of experience (or seniority), however, 
kept decreasing from 8.3% in 1995 to 4.2% in 2002, and to 1.7% in 2007. 
We  also run  wage  regressions controlling  for a  full  set of  job  categories  instead of 
controlling for only occupation, industry, and ownership dummies. The Fields decomposition 
results are reported in panel B of Table 4. The explanatory powers of job structure, as well as 
the model, increase because more between-job inequality is captured. In 2002, over one half 
of the explanatory power of the model came from job characteristics. The patterns in panel B 
are similar to those in panel A. 
Adding ranking information into wage equations increased the explanatory power, but 
only marginally. Ranking, or job title, seems to have contributed to the rising wage inequality 
(see columns 1-4 of Table 5). For restricted samples with job titles, job title played an even 
bigger role. In 2002, 15% of the model’s explanatory power came from job titles, only less 
than that from region, which was 48% (see column 8 of Table 5). 
15(Insert Table 5 around here)
4.3 Within-Job Inequality: Evidence from Quantile Regressions
  OLS regressions of wage equations describe how wages differ between jobs on average. 
Quantile regressions at various percentiles give a more detailed description of the conditional 
distribution of wages. If quantile regressions give estimates that are not significantly different 
across percentiles, it is more probable that the  within-job wage  distributions are identical. 
Otherwise,  different jobs are associated with  different inequalities.  Results from  different 
years show how relative within-job inequalities changed over time. An important finding in 
Table  6, therefore, is that within-job  inequalities for different jobs were  different and the 
pattern changed between 1995 and 2007.
Taking managerial jobs as a reference group, unskilled workers earned 38% less at the 
10th  percentile  of  the  conditional  wage  distribution. The  regressions at the  50th  and  90th 
percentiles gave results of -20% and -15%, revealing that unskilled workers earned less than 
managerial jobs and the gap was larger at a lower wage than at a higher wage.8 This result 
indicates that within-job inequality for unskilled workers was larger than that for managerial 
jobs. 
(Insert Table 6 around here)
In  2007,  the  coefficient for  unskilled  workers  was still  -0.38  in  the  10th  percentile 
quantile regression, but the gap in the 50th and 90th percentile regressions (-0.36 and -0.30, 
respectively) was larger than in 1995. Therefore, either within-group inequality for skilled 
workers  decreased  or  that  for  managerial  jobs  increased,  or  both.  The  magnitude  of 
coefficients was not necessarily monotonic in percentiles as indicated by coefficients for the 
16
8  Wage levels here refer to positions on conditional wage distributions. same variable (unskilled workers for example) in 2002.
For skilled workers, the results also indicate that within-group inequality was larger than 
that for managerial jobs in both 1995 and 2007. The changes in coefficients for this period 
are evenly distributed across various percentiles. For the 10th percentile quantile regression, 
the coefficient decreased from -0.17 in 1995 to -0.30 in 2007. The extents of decreases are 
about the same as those for coefficients at the 50th  and 90th percentiles. The whole  wage 
distribution  for  skilled  workers  moved  to  a  lower position,  but there  was  no significant 
change in relative inequality between the skilled workers and managerial jobs. 
Quantile  regressions  also  give  more  information  on  wage  differentials  between 
ownerships. In 1995, at the bottom of conditional wage distribution, workers in SOEs earned 
more than those in the private sector did, but the difference is insignificant. In upper positions 
(50th and 90th percentiles), however, workers in private sectors had significantly higher wages 
than those in SOEs. These results indicate that private sectors had performed better in general 
and had more dispersion in wage distribution by the mid-1990s. 
Coefficients for the  private  sector in various quantile  regressions  turned  negative  in 
2002. The  difference  at the  upper  position  was smaller, which  still means that the  wage 
dispersion within the private sector was larger. The SOEs performed even better in 2007, and 
the wage gap at the upper positions enlarged, an indication that inequality within the SOEs 
had increased. Because the coefficients in these regressions show relative difference in wage 
levels between  different ownerships, this result may also  mean that the inequality in the 
private  sector  had  decreased;  however,  we  have  not found  evidence  in  support of  this 
hypothesis. Instead, the CHIP data show an increased rather than decreased Gini coefficient: 
0.388 in 1995, 0.406 in 2002, and 0.409 in 2007.
17Different job ranks also had different within-group inequalities (see Table 3). The results 
for 1995 indicate that professional or managerial jobs of different seniority levels had less 
wage dispersions than the reference group (those without ranks or titles). This changed for 
some groups in 2002. The senior professional workers for instance, seemed to have larger 
within-group inequality in 2002, as the wage gaps between the senior professional workers 
and the reference groups were larger at higher wages than at lower wages. The within-group 
inequality for middle level professional jobs also increased relatively. 
4.4 Decomposing Changes in Wage Inequality: Price Effect and Composition Effect
This  subsection  addresses  the  contributions  of  changes  in  relative  number  of  jobs 
(composition effect) and relative wages between and within jobs (price effect) to the increase 
in wage inequalitZ. We construct a series of counterfactual wage inequalities using the DFL 
approach, which can be used to hold job characteristics constant over time. 
To assess the contribution of the price effect to the increase in wage inequality between 
1995 and 2002, we calculate a counterfactual inequality that would have prevailed in 2002 if 
the  distribution  of  job  characteristics  were  as  in  1995.  The  difference  between  this 
counterfactual inequality (a combination of 2002 price structure and 1995 job composition) 
and the actual one of 1995 (a combination of 1995 price structure and 1995 job composition) 
was price effect. Using  DFL, the above counterfactual can be obtained by reweighting the 
wage data in 2002 to reflect the changes in job characteristics between 1995 and 2002. We 
first run a probit model of using data in 1995 and 2002, in which Y1995 equals 
one if the observation belongs to 1995 and zero otherwise, and X is a vector of job categories. 
Then  we  predict  a  weight  for  each  observation  in  2002  using  the  formula 
, which is used to calculate counterfactual wage inequality. 
18Take manufacturing workers for example: X=manuf. We would give 2002 observations 
with manufacturing  jobs higher weight when calculating  counterfactual inequality because 
there were more manufacturing jobs in 1995 than in 2002. This is exactly the role played by 
the weight  .9
Row  1,  column  2  of Table  7  is  the  counterfactual  inequality of  d9010  (differential 
between the 90th and 10th percentiles) in 2002, with job characteristics held at the 1995 level. 
The elements in row 1, column 1, and row 2, column 2 are the actual inequalities for 1995 
and  2002,  respectively.  The  change  in  d9010  between  1995  and  2002  totaled  0.22 
(=1.653-1.433), 73% of which was due to changes in relative wages (=(1.593-1.433)/0.22), 
and 27% due to composition effect. Actual and counterfactual inequality measures of d5010 
and d9050 are also reported in Table 7. At the lower-half (d5010), the inequality increase 
between 1995 and 2002 totaled 0.114, 55% of which was due to price effect, while at the 
upper half the increase in inequality totaled 0.107, 92% of which was due to price effect. 
We  also construct counterfactuals for inequalities in 2007, holding  job characteristics 
constant at the 2002 level (for example, row 2, column 3 is a counterfactual d9010). From 
2002  to  2007,  the  increase  in  d9010  was  0.225,  and  over  70%  of  the  increase  was 
concentrated at the upper half. Price effect played a major role at both the upper and lower 
half of the wage distribution, accounting for about 87% of the increase in inequality. 
Alternative  counterfactuals can be  constructed.  Row 2,  column 1,  for example, is a 
counterfactual d9010 using 1995 wage data and reweighting  them to resemble the 2002 job 
composition. The decomposition calculation shows that the composition  and price effects 
between 1995 and 2002 were 45% and 55%, respectively. Decompositions at different parts 
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9 See DiNardo et al. (1996) for technical details.of the wage distribution (d5010, d9050) show similar results, with price effect being around 
45%.  We  also  construct counterfactuals  using  2002  wage  data  and  reweighting  them  to 
resemble 2007 job composition (elements in column 2, rows 3, 6, and 9). Three quarters of 
the increase in d9010 was due to price effect, and the price effect was larger at the upper half 
of the wage distribution. 
(Insert Table 7 around here)
Although  alternative  counterfactuals produce  different results,  some  general  patterns 
emerge. Both composition change and changes in relative wages between and within jobs 
contributed to the rising  wage inequality. Relatively speaking, composition effect played a 
more important role in the 1995-2002 period and was more important at the lower-half wage 
distribution, while price effect played a major role in the 2002-2007 period and was more 
important at the upper-half wage distribution. 
Price effect comes from two sources: the wage gaps between jobs and within jobs. We 
examine the relative importance of these two gaps through an approach using the hybrid of 
variance decomposition and reweighting (see Lemieux et al., 2009). The results are reported 
in panel E and F in Table 7. Between 1995 and 2002, most of the increase in variance was 
due to increase in between-job inequality. The total increase was 0.103 and the increase in 
between-job variance was 0.075. The decomposition results were highly dependent on how 
the counterfactuals were constructed. For the 2002-2007 period, within-job inequality played 
a predominant role, for which 38% or 68% was due to price effect, depending on how the 
counterfactuals were constructed.
Instead of using log wage directly, columns 4-6 use the residuals of log wages to purge 
out the effect of changes in demographic variables. We first run regression of log  wage on 
20schooling  years, experience, experience squared, sex, and province  dummy variables, and 
then  predicted  wage  residuals.  The  actual  and  counterfactual  inequalities  are  calculated 
similarly. All the inequality measures decreased significantly, but the patterns we observe in 
columns 1-3 remain.10 
The  decomposition  findings in  this subsection appear consistent with  the timing  and 
contents of major events in China’s transitional process. First, a relatively larger composition 
effect in the 1995-2002 period echoes major reforms in the late 1990s when many SOEs were 
privatized.  The  private  sector  subsequently  absorbed  a  large  number  of  laid-off  or 
unemployed workers and transferred them to other occupations or industries. 
Second, several major events or forces can explain the rise in skill price in both the 
1995-2002  and  2002-2007  periods:  (1)  Ownership  restructuring  made  the  wage  setting 
behavior more market-oriented as more workers were now in the private sector and as wage 
gaps within different sectors (especially in the SOEs) enlarged.11 (2) Technological progress 
increased the demand for non-routine skilled workers. (3) Greater openness increased China’s 
involvement in the globalized production process and increased demand for skilled labor. In 
particular,  in  the  2002-2007 period,  when  China  was already a  member  of WTO, China 
experienced a sharp increase in the ratio of export over GDP, increasing from 22% in 2002 to 
36% in 2007 (NBS, 2009). Along  with rapid export growth, China’s exports became more 
sophisticated,  with  resources  moving  from  agriculture  and  textiles  into  machinery, 
21
10	 ﾠTable 11 in the appendix reports the decomposition results for men and women. The results by gender suggest similar 
conclusions to the ones with the pooled sample. Although there is a difference between genders, it is difficult to detect 
consistent differential patterns. We therefore choose to contend with the pooled sample results and leave a detailed gender 
differential study for future research.
11 The employment share in SOEs decreased from 59% in 1995 to 29% in 2002. The decrease was dramatic immediately 
after the 15th National Congress of the Communist Party of China in 1997. From 1997 to 1998 SOE employment share 
decreased by 11%. This decreased more gradually between 2002 and 2007 (from 29% to 22%) (NBS, 2009).electronics, and assembly (Amiti and Freund, 2008).12 This force tended to increase demand 
for skilled labor and drive up skill prices. 13
5  Discussion and Conclusions
Job  structure  in terms  of  occupation,  industry, and  ownership changed  significantly 
between 1995 and 2007. In this paper, we use three Chinese  urban household surveys for 
1995, 2002, and 2007 to evaluate how these changes affected China’s urban wage inequality. 
A series of statistical  exercises (OLS/quantile  regression, Fields decomposition, and DFL 
decomposition) suggest that job structure has a substantial effect on wage inequality and it is 
an important channel through which more fundamental forces influence the labor market and 
wage inequality.
Our results also convey that China’s rising wage inequality is the result of several forces 
working  together.  First,  we  can  conclude  that technological  progress  was a  fundamental 
force, without which a large proportion of the job structure change would not have happened. 
By focusing on job structure, we can have a closer look at how technological change affected 
the labor market. In particular, the job structure change suggests that technological change 
played a role in substituting the routine task jobs and in complementing the non-routine task 
jobs.  The  role  played  by  technological  change  has  a  clear  policy  implication.  In  an 
information age, creative  thinking  and personal  skills are  more  important than  mechanic 
(routine)  skills.  The  former  skills  should  be  emphasized  in  our  education  and  training 
programs. Otherwise, we may risk losing our middle class.
Institutional factors were equally important. One important finding of this paper is that 
22
12 China also witnessed a broadening of globalization in the 1990s. Wan et al. (2007) gave a brief description on China’s 
journey to globalization through trade and tourism, foreign investment, and movement of people, but Branstetter and Lardy 
(2006) argue that accession into WTO was a watershed in China’s globalization process.
13 See Goldberg and Pavcnik (2007) for a detailed discussion of why openness can influence skill prices.ownership structure is an increasingly important contributor to wage inequality. This is partly 
because wage inequality in the public sector has increased. Another aspect is that many SOEs 
enjoy monopolistic power, and workers in this sector earn significantly higher wages than 
those in the private sectors do. These findings echo public concern about the monopolistic 
power of SOEs. We hope this paper can provide some empirical evidence for pushing SOE 
reforms forward.
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24Table 1 Summary Statistics
Variable 1995 2002 2007
(1) (2) (3)
Years of schooling 10.79 11.52 12.81
Experience (age – years of schooling – 6) 19.51 20.36 21.71
Female  0.47 0.44 0.45
Occupation
     Managerial (Head/Unit Head) 0.12 0.11 0.05
     Professional 0.23 0.22 0.19
     Ordinary Staff 0.21 0.21 0.35
     Unskilled Worker 0.17 0.22 0.17
     Skilled Worker 0.22 0.20 0.19
     Others  0.05 0.04 0.04
Industry
     Manufacturing 0.42 0.26 0.20
     Mining and geological survey and prospecting 0.01 0.02 0.01
     Construction 0.03 0.03 0.03
     Transportation, communications, posts and telecommunications 0.05 0.08 0.10
     Commerce and trade, restaurants & catering, materials supply 0.14 0.10 0.14
     Real estate, public utilities, personal and consulting services 0.04 0.14 0.17
     Health, physical culture and social welfare 0.05 0.05 0.04
     Education, culture, arts and broadcasting 0.07 0.09 0.09
     Scientific research and technical services 0.03 0.03 0.02
     Finance/insurance 0.02 0.03 0.03
     Government and Party organs, social organizations 0.12 0.13 0.16
     Agriculture/forestry/husbandry/fishing 0.02 0.01 0.01
     Other 0.01 0.02 0.00
Firm/Organization Ownership
     State Owned Enterprises 0.82 0.70 0.57
     Collectively Owned 0.16 0.07 0.06
     Private, Foreign, Joint Owned, and Others 0.02 0.23 0.37
Ln(Wage) 8.53 9.02 9.50
Standard Deviation of Ln(Wage) 0.69 0.76 0.82
50th – 10th Percentile of Ln(Wage) 0.81 0.92 0.99
90th – 50th Percentile of Ln(Wage) 0.62 0.73 0.89
No. of obs 10974 9518 10827
25Table 2 Wage Determination in 1995, 2002, and 2007, OLS
1995 2002 2007 1995 2002 2007
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Years of schooling 0.05*** 0.08*** 0.11*** 0.03*** 0.04*** 0.07***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Experience  0.05*** 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.05*** 0.04*** 0.04***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Experience squared/100 -0.08*** -0.06*** -0.07*** -0.09*** -0.07*** -0.07***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Female  -0.15*** -0.19*** -0.30*** -0.12*** -0.15*** -0.25***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Occupation
Professional -0.01 -0.05** -0.06*
(0.02) (0.03) (0.03)
Ordinary Staff -0.12*** -0.16*** -0.18***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03)
Unskilled Worker -0.26*** -0.40*** -0.37***
(0.02) (0.03) (0.04)
Skilled Worker -0.14*** -0.18*** -0.24***
(0.02) (0.03) (0.03)
Others -0.21*** -0.76*** -0.42***
(0.03) (0.04) (0.04)
Industry
Industry2 0.12** 0.05 0.26***
(0.05) (0.05) (0.06)
Industry3 -0.01 -0.03 -0.02
(0.03) (0.04) (0.04)
Industry4 0.08*** 0.10*** 0.04
(0.03) (0.03) (0.02)
Industry5 -0.05*** -0.12*** -0.11***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03)
Industry6 0.00 -0.02 -0.06**
(0.03) (0.02) (0.02)
Industry7 0.08*** 0.18*** -0.04
(0.03) (0.03) (0.04)
Industry8 0.06*** 0.16*** 0.01
(0.02) (0.03) (0.03)
Industry9 0.14*** 0.19*** 0.13***
(0.04) (0.04) (0.05)
Industry10 0.30*** 0.14*** 0.17***
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Industry11 0.06*** 0.12*** 0.01
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03)
Industry12 0.03 0.02 0.01
(0.04) (0.06) (0.07)
Industry13 -0.02 0.04 -
(0.07) (0.05)
Ownership
Collective Owned -0.23*** -0.25*** -0.23***
(0.02) (0.03) (0.03)
Private or Joint Owned 0.03 -0.18*** -0.30***
(0.04) (0.02) (0.02)
R2_Adj 0.26 0.24 0.29 0.30 0.34 0.36
N 10974 9518 10827 10974 9518 10827
Note: *, **, and *** denote significance levels at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. Standard errors are in parenthesis. Province dummies and 
constant term are controlled for. Managerial occupation and state owned enterprises are omitted groups. Industries 1 refers to Manufacturing 
(omitted  group);  Industry  2:  Mining  and  geological  survey  and  prospecting;  Industry  3:  Construction;  Industry  4:  Transportation, 
communications, posts and telecommunications; Industry 5: Commerce and trade, restaurants & catering, materials supply; Industry 6: Real 
26estate, public  utilities, personal and consulting services; Industry 7:  Health, physical culture  and  social welfare; Industry 8: Education, 
culture,  arts  and  broadcasting; Industry 9:  Scientific  research and technical services;  Industry 10:  Finance  and  insurance;  Industry 11: 
Government and Party organs, social organizations; Industry 12: Agriculture, forestry, husbandry, fishing; Industry 13: Other. 
Table 3 Rank and Wage Determination in 1995 and 2002
` OLS ` ` ` `Quantile Quantile Quantile Quantile Quantile Quantile Quantile
Full Sample Full Sample Restricted 
Sample
Restricted 
Sample Full Sample Full Sample Full Sample Full Sample Full Sample Full Sample
1995 2002 1995 2002 1995 ` ` 2002 ` `
Q10 Q50 Q90 Q10 Q50 Q90
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Senior Professional (Rank1) 0.19*** 0.24*** ` ` 0.21*** 0.15*** 0.12*** `0.20** 0.22*** 0.24***
(0.04) (0.04) (0.06) (0.03) (0.05) (0.09) (0.04) (0.05)
Middle Level Professional 
(Rank2)
0.11*** 0.13*** -0.10*** -0.15*** 0.16*** 0.08*** 0.04 0.15** 0.10*** 0.12***
(0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.02) (0.03) (0.06) (0.03) (0.03)
Junior Professional (Rank3) 0.07*** 0.04 -0.17*** -0.27*** 0.11*** 0.04** 0.02 0.09 0.02 -0.00
(0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.06) (0.03) (0.04)
Lowest Level Professional or 
Technician (Rank4)
0.03 0.01 -0.23*** -0.31*** 0.04 -0.00 -0.01 0.04 -0.04 -0.04
(0.03) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.02) (0.03) (0.11) (0.04) (0.06)
Senior Official (Rank5) 0.19 -0.05 -0.03 -0.31 0.29 0.07 0.10 0.05 0.14 0.14
(0.17) (0.23) (0.14) (0.20) (0.25) (0.14) (0.19) (0.17) (0.19) (0.09)
Middle Level Official (Rank6) 0.15*** 0.31*** -0.04 0.07 0.15** 0.16*** 0.06 0.38*** 0.30*** 0.23***
(0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.08) (0.04) (0.06) (0.12) (0.05) (0.07)
Junior Official (Rank7) 0.11*** 0.14*** -0.10*** -0.14*** 0.17*** 0.09*** 0.02 0.22*** 0.09*** 0.11**
(0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.03) (0.04) (0.07) (0.03) (0.04)
R2_Adj 0.30 0.35 0.30 0.27
N 10974 9518 4540 3542 10974 10974 10974 `9518 9518 9518
Note: *, **, and *** denote significance levels at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. Standard errors are in parenthesis. Years of schooling, 
experience, experience squared, sex, occupation, industry, ownership, province, and constant term are controlled for in all the regressions. In 
columns 3 and 4, the omitted group is senior professionals; whereas in other columns the omitted group is the no-rank group (those who do 
not have titles).
27Table 4 Explanatory Power of Different Factors (Fields Decomposition, %)
1995 2002 2007 1995 2002 2007
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
A
Schooling Years 2.0  4.7  8.7  6.6  13.5  24.3 
Experience  8.3  4.2  1.7  27.1  12.0  4.8 
Sex  1.4  1.5  2.9  4.7  4.5  8.2 
Region  11.3  8.1  10.4  37.1  23.5  29.2 
Job characteristics 7.4  16.1  12.0  24.4  46.6  33.5 
Occupation  3.9  9.4  4.8  12.7  27.0  13.6 
Industry  1.3  3.5  1.8  4.2  10.0  4.9 
Ownership  2.3  3.3  5.4  7.5  9.5  15.0 
Residual  69.6  65.4  64.3 
B
Schooling Years 1.9  4.6  8.4  5.9  12.2  22.6 
Experience  8.3  4.2  1.7  25.3  11.1  4.6 
Sex  1.4  1.5  2.8  4.3  3.9  7.5 
Region  11.2  7.9  10.3  34.4  20.9  27.6 
Job characteristics 9.8  19.6  14.1  30.0  52.0  37.6 
Residual  67.4  62.3  62.6 
Table 5 Explanatory Power of Different Factors Considering Rank (Fields Decomposition, %)
Full Sample Full Sample Full Sample Full Sample Full Sample Restricted Sample Restricted Sample Restricted Sample Restricted Sample Restricted Sample
1995 2002 1995 2002 1995 2002 1995 2002
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Schooling Years 1.7 4.3 5.5 12.2 1.3 1.6 4.1 6.0
Experience  7.8 3.8 25.6 11.0 5.5 2.9 17.7 10.5
Sex  1.4 1.5 4.7 4.2 0.8 0.6 2.5 2.2
Region  11.3 8.3 37.0 23.6 16.6 13.1 53.5 47.7
Job characteristics 8.4 17.2 27.3 49.1 6.9 9.2 22.1 33.6
Occupation 2.8 7.6 9.1 21.8 1.1 0.7 3.4 2.5
Industry 1.2 3.2 3.8 9.0 1.5 3.6 4.8 13.2
Ownership 2.3 3.3 7.4 9.3 1.5 0.9 4.9 3.4
Rank 2.1 3.1 7.0 8.9 2.8 4.0 9.0 14.6
Residual 69.4 65.0 69.0 72.6
28Table 6 Quantile Regression Results of Wage Determination
1995 1995 1995 `2002 2002 2002 `2007 2007 2007
q10 q50 q90 `q10 q50 q90 `q10 q50 q90
Years of schooling 0.03*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.05*** 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.08*** 0.07*** 0.06***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00)
Experience  0.08*** 0.04*** 0.03*** 0.07*** 0.03*** 0.02*** 0.05*** 0.03*** 0.03***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Experience squared/100 -0.14*** -0.06*** -0.03*** -0.13*** -0.05*** -0.03*** -0.10*** -0.06*** -0.05***
(0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Female  -0.13*** -0.08*** -0.10*** -0.17*** -0.14*** -0.12*** -0.29*** -0.26*** -0.21***
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02)
Occupation
Professional 0.01 -0.00 -0.02 -0.06 -0.02 -0.05* -0.02 -0.02 -0.06
(0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.05) (0.03) (0.03) (0.06) (0.03) (0.04)
Ordinary Staff -0.17*** -0.08*** -0.08*** -0.18*** -0.13*** -0.17*** -0.21*** -0.17*** -0.17***
(0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.05) (0.03) (0.03) (0.05) (0.03) (0.04)
Unskilled Worker -0.38*** -0.20*** -0.15*** -0.47*** -0.34*** -0.39*** -0.38*** -0.36*** -0.30***
(0.04) (0.02) (0.03) (0.06) (0.03) (0.03) (0.06) (0.03) (0.05)
Skilled Worker -0.17*** -0.09*** -0.07*** -0.22*** -0.12*** -0.19*** -0.30*** -0.21*** -0.20***
(0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.06) (0.03) (0.03) (0.06) (0.03) (0.05)
Others -0.25*** -0.15*** -0.14*** -1.80*** -0.57*** -0.40*** -0.48*** -0.40*** -0.28***
(0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.08) (0.04) (0.05) (0.08) (0.04) (0.06)
Industry
Industry2 0.26*** 0.11** 0.02 0.09 0.07 -0.08 0.32*** 0.27*** 0.25***
(0.08) (0.05) (0.06) (0.11) (0.05) (0.06) (0.10) (0.05) (0.07)
Industry3 0.05 0.03 0.03 -0.20** -0.02 0.09** -0.09 0.05 -0.13**
(0.05) (0.03) (0.04) (0.08) (0.04) (0.04) (0.07) (0.04) (0.05)
Industry4 0.08** 0.09*** 0.16*** 0.10* 0.19*** 0.17*** -0.02 0.10*** -0.02
(0.04) (0.02) (0.03) (0.06) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.02) (0.03)
Industry5 -0.09*** -0.02 -0.02 -0.26*** -0.04 -0.02 -0.13*** 0.01 -0.12***
(0.03) (0.01) (0.02) (0.05) (0.03) (0.03) (0.05) (0.02) (0.03)
Industry6 -0.08* 0.02 0.06* -0.10** 0.03 0.10*** -0.07* -0.03 -0.08**
(0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.02) (0.02) (0.04) (0.02) (0.03)
Industry7 0.12*** 0.11*** 0.04 0.22*** 0.26*** 0.16*** -0.07 0.04 -0.04
(0.04) (0.02) (0.03) (0.07) (0.03) (0.03) (0.07) (0.03) (0.05)
Industry8 0.16*** 0.06*** -0.01 0.14** 0.23*** 0.17*** 0.03 0.08*** -0.07*
(0.04) (0.02) (0.03) (0.06) (0.03) (0.03) (0.05) (0.03) (0.04)
Industry9 0.22*** 0.14*** 0.04 0.07 0.24*** 0.28*** 0.15* 0.20*** -0.04
(0.05) (0.03) (0.04) (0.09) (0.04) (0.04) (0.08) (0.04) (0.06)
Industry10 0.29*** 0.31*** 0.26*** 0.24*** 0.19*** 0.18*** 0.18** 0.18*** 0.08
(0.06) (0.03) (0.04) (0.08) (0.04) (0.04) (0.07) (0.04) (0.05)
Industry11 0.16*** 0.06*** -0.03 0.15*** 0.19*** 0.13*** 0.02 0.08*** -0.07**
(0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.05) (0.03) (0.03) (0.05) (0.02) (0.03)
Industry12 0.05 0.03 0.12*** 0.06 0.07 -0.01 0.11 0.08 -0.15*
(0.06) (0.04) (0.05) (0.12) (0.06) (0.06) (0.12) (0.06) (0.09)
Industry13 -0.06 -0.02 0.12 0.01 0.07 0.01
(0.10) (0.06) (0.07) (0.10) (0.05) (0.05)
Ownership
Collective Owned -0.31*** -0.22*** -0.19*** -0.27*** -0.27*** -0.16*** -0.17*** -0.24*** -0.26***
(0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.06) (0.03) (0.03) (0.05) (0.03) (0.04)
Private or Joint 
Owned
-0.10 0.07** 0.10** -0.26*** -0.11*** -0.05*** -0.30*** -0.25*** -0.23***
(0.06) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.01) (0.02)
N 10974 10974 10974 9518 9518 9518 10827 10827 10827
Note: *, **, and *** denote significance levels at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. Standard errors are in parenthesis. Province dummies and 
constant term are controlled for. Managerial occupation and state owned enterprises are omitted groups. Industries 1 refers to Manufacturing 
29(omitted  group);  Industry  2:  Mining  and  geological  survey  and  prospecting;  Industry  3:  Construction;  Industry  4:    Transportation, 
communications, posts and telecommunications; Industry 5: Commerce and trade, restaurants & catering, materials supply; Industry 6: Real 
estate, public  utilities, personal and consulting services; Industry 7:  Health, physical culture  and  social welfare; Industry 8: Education, 
culture,  arts  and  broadcasting; Industry 9:  Scientific  research and technical services;  Industry 10:  Finance  and  insurance;  Industry 11: 
Government and Party organs, social organizations; Industry 12: Agriculture, forestry, husbandry, fishing; Industry 13: Other.
Table 7 Actual Inequalities and Counterfactuals Constructed Using DFL Approach
Log (wage) Log (wage) Log (wage) Residual of Log (wage) Residual of Log (wage) Residual of Log (wage)
P95 P02 P07 P95 P02 P07
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
A: 90th percentile -10th percentile
d9010_S95 1.433  1.593  1.761  1.152  1.347  1.428 
d9010_S02 1.554  1.653  1.849  1.236  1.394  1.445 
d9010_S07 1.674  1.710  1.878  1.321  1.449  1.474 
B: 50th percentile -10th percentile
d5010_S95 0.808  0.871  0.935  0.636  0.758  0.740 
d5010_S02 0.871  0.922  0.978  0.666  0.792  0.753 
d5010_S07 0.957  0.962  0.986  0.736  0.832  0.792 
C: 90th percentile -50th percentile
d9050_S95 0.624  0.722  0.826  0.517  0.589  0.688 
d9050_S02 0.684  0.731  0.871  0.569  0.601  0.692 
d9050_S07 0.717  0.748  0.892  0.585  0.617  0.682 
D: Variance of Log Wage
var_S95 0.475  0.503  0.510  0.349  0.382  0.351 
var_S02 0.599  0.578  0.608  0.424  0.437  0.422 
var_S07 0.742  0.598  0.669  0.500  0.460  0.477 
E: Between-job Variance
varxb_S95 0.065  0.124  0.099  0.024  0.055  0.031 
varxb_S02 0.149  0.140  0.133  0.071  0.065  0.044 
varxb_S07 0.258  0.129  0.135  0.117  0.063  0.047 
F: Within-job Variance
varres_S95 0.409  0.379  0.411  0.325  0.327  0.320 
varres_S02 0.450  0.438  0.475  0.353  0.372  0.378 
varres_S07 0.484  0.469  0.535  0.383  0.397  0.430 
Note: Residual of Log (wage) is obtained by first running regressions of Log (wage) on schooling years, experience, experience squared, sex, and 
province dummy variables, and then predicting wage residuals. P95, P02, and P07 denote skill prices of 1995, 2002, and 2007, respectively; whereas 
S95, S02, and S07 denote skill distribution of 1995, 2002, and 2007, respectively.
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Table 8 Regional Distribution of Observations
1995 1995 1995 2002 2002 2002 2007 2007 2007
East Central West East Central West East Central West
By Occupation (%)
     Managerial (Head/Unit Head) 11.2 11.9 12.2 10.0 12.1 11.1 4.6 6.0 5.3
     Professional 21.9 19.6 27.4 19.4 24.5 22.6 20.6 18.9 18.4
     Ordinary Staff 18.6 23.0 22.2 22.0 20.3 21.2 36.5 35.0 33.9
     Unskilled Worker 18.3 20.2 11.5 25.3 19.2 20.6 17.5 13.2 19.0
     Skilled Worker 24.5 19.3 22.4 18.5 20.0 20.7 17.3 24.2 18.1
     Others  5.5 6.1 4.4 4.8 3.8 3.8 3.6 2.8 5.4
By Industry (%)
     Manufacturing 43.5 43.3 38.9 24.6 26.9 27.2 18.2 22.2 19.3
     Mining and geological survey 0.3 1.0 2.1 0.5 3.4 1.0 0.9 2.4 0.9
     Construction 3.1 2.1 3.7 3.6 2.6 3.9 3.4 2.8 2.9
     Transportation, communications, 
posts and telecommunications 5.8 4.6 4.8 9.8 7.0 6.5 12.2 8.6 8.8
     Commerce and trade, restaurants & 
catering, materials supply 14.5 13.5 14.5 11.8 9.0 9.9 15.7 11.0 13.3
     Real estate, public utilities, personal 
and consulting services 4.9 3.1 2.8 17.7 13.1 11.7 15.8 15.7 18.9
     Health, physical culture and 
social welfare 4.4 4.6 5.2 3.7 6.6 5.7 3.8 4.5 4.6
     Education, culture, arts and broadcasting 7.3 8.1 6.5 7.4 11.2 9.8 8.6 9.6 8.9
     Scientific research and technical services 2.3 1.7 3.9 3.1 2.1 3.0 2.3 2.6 2.2
     Finance/insurance 1.7 2.3 2.0 3.3 2.9 2.0 2.8 3.4 3.2
     Government and Party organs, 
social organizations 9.3 14.0 13.1 10.7 12.3 15.5 16.0 16.5 15.3
     Agriculture/forestry/husbandry/fishing 1.9 1.4 2.0 0.9 0.9 2.2 0.4 0.8 1.8
     Other 1.1 0.2 0.4 2.8 2.0 1.6 0.0 0.0 0.0
By Ownership (%)
     State Owned Enterprises 77.9 84.3 86.0 63.5 75.7 72.8 50.4 67.1 56.4
     Collectively Owned 18.3 14.7 12.9 9.1 5.6 6.4 6.7 6.2 4.8
     Private, Foreign, Joint Owned, 
and Others 3.8 1.0 1.1 27.4 18.7 20.8 42.9 26.7 38.9
No. of Obs. 4,073 3,923 2,978 3,668 3,279 2,571 4,588 3,121 3,118
31Table 9 Working Time in 1995 and 2002
1995 1995 1995 1995 1995 2002 2002 2002 2002 2002 2002 2002 2002
Days per week Days per week Hours per day Hours per day Months per year Months per year Days per month Days per month Hours per day Hours per day
Mean  SD Mean  SD Mean  SD Mean  SD Mean  SD
By Occupation
     Managerial (Head/Unit Head) 5.4  0.6  7.9  0.9  11.9  0.9  22.7  2.8  8.0  1.1 
     Professional 5.3  0.6  7.7  0.9  11.6  1.5  22.5  3.4  8.0  1.3 
     Ordinary Staff 5.4  0.6  7.7  0.9  11.8  1.2  22.5  3.1  7.9  1.2 
     Unskilled Worker 5.6  0.7  7.7  1.1  11.4  1.8  24.1  4.2  8.3  1.8 
     Skilled Worker 5.5  0.7  7.8  1.0  11.6  1.5  23.0  3.8  8.2  1.6 
     Others  5.7  0.8  7.6  1.2  11.3  2.1  25.5  5.1  8.8  2.3 
By Industry
     Manufacturing 5.5  0.7  7.7  1.0  11.7  1.5  23.1  3.6  8.1  1.2 
     Mining and geological survey 5.3  0.5  7.7  0.8  11.6  1.7  22.8  3.4  8.2  0.9 
     Construction 5.5  0.6  7.8  0.8  11.5  1.8  23.3  3.9  8.1  1.2 
     Transportation, communications, 
posts and telecommunications 5.5  0.7  7.8  1.0  11.7  1.5  23.0  4.2  8.3  1.9 
     Commerce and trade, restaurants & 
catering, materials supply 5.6  0.7  7.6  1.0  11.4  1.9  25.0  4.3  8.3  1.8 
     Real estate, public utilities, personal 
and consulting services 5.5  0.7  7.7  1.0  11.6  1.5  23.4  3.7  8.2  1.8 
     Health, physical culture and 
social welfare 5.4  0.6  7.7  0.9  11.8  1.1  22.8  3.2  7.9  1.3 
     Education, culture, arts and broadcasting 5.3  0.6  7.7  1.1  11.3  1.6  22.3  3.3  8.0  1.5 
     Scientific research and technical services 5.3  0.5  7.8  0.9  11.7  1.3  22.3  2.8  8.0  0.9 
     Finance/insurance 5.4  0.6  7.8  1.1  11.5  1.9  22.8  3.6  7.8  1.6 
     Government and Party organs, 
social organizations 5.3  0.5  7.8  0.9  11.9  0.8  22.2  3.1  8.0  1.2 
     Agriculture/forestry/husbandry/fishing 5.3  0.5  7.8  1.0  11.8  0.7  22.5  3.3  8.3  1.7 
     Other 5.3  0.6  7.7  1.0  11.2  2.3  22.9  5.0  8.3  2.6 
By Ownership
     State Owned Enterprises 5.4  0.6  7.7  0.9  11.7  1.4  22.6  3.4  8.0  1.4 
     Collectively Owned 5.6  0.8  7.7  1.1  11.7  1.4  23.3  3.7  8.1  1.3 
     Private, Foreign, Joint Owned, 
and Others 5.8  0.6  8.1  1.2  11.4  1.9  24.7  4.3  8.4  1.8 
Total Obs. 5.5  0.6  7.7  1.0  11.6  1.5  23.1  3.7  8.1  1.5 
Table 10 Number of Observations in Domestic and Foreign (or Joint Venture) Firms







     Manufacturing 4,545 83 2,374 112
     Mining and geological survey 115 0 158 0
     Construction 319 1 316 2
     Transportation, communications, posts and telecommunications 555 3 750 9
     Commerce and trade, restaurants & catering, materials supply 1,513 39 947 36
     Real estate, public utilities, personal and consulting services 402 3 1,353 26
     Health, physical culture and social welfare 513 0 495 3
     Education, culture, arts and broadcasting 813 0 887 4
     Scientific research and technical services 274 1 249 9
     Finance/insurance 218 2 266 1
     Government and Party organs, social organizations 1,317 1 1,192 2
     Agriculture/forestry/husbandry/fishing 191 0 120 1
     Other 61 5 198 8
Total 10,836 138 9,305 213
32Table 11 Reweighting Decomposition of Wage Inequality by Gender
` Male Male Male Male Male Male Male Female Female Female Female Female Female Female
` Log (wage) Log (wage) Log (wage) ` Residual of Log (wage) Residual of Log (wage) Residual of Log (wage) Log (wage) Log (wage) Log (wage) ` Residual of Log (wage) Residual of Log (wage) Residual of Log (wage)
` P95 P02 P07 ` P95 P02 P07 P95 P02 P07 ` P95 P02 P07
` (1) (2) (3) ` (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) ` (10) (11) (12)
A: 90th percentile -10th percentile A: 90th percentile -10th percentile A: 90th percentile -10th percentile A: 90th percentile -10th percentile A: 90th percentile -10th percentile A: 90th percentile -10th percentile A: 90th percentile -10th percentile A: 90th percentile -10th percentile A: 90th percentile -10th percentile A: 90th percentile -10th percentile A: 90th percentile -10th percentile A: 90th percentile -10th percentile A: 90th percentile -10th percentile A: 90th percentile -10th percentile A: 90th percentile -10th percentile A: 90th percentile -10th percentile
d9010_S95 1.309  1.465  1.645  1.082  1.266  1.362  1.502  1.644  1.790  1.202  1.411  1.489 
d9010_S02 1.404  1.551  1.746  1.139  1.333  1.397  1.640  1.697  1.795  1.263  1.447  1.490 
d9010_S07 1.470  1.596  1.810  1.139  1.378  1.436  1.712  1.754  1.805  1.358  1.503  1.512 
B: 50th percentile -10th percentile B: 50th percentile -10th percentile B: 50th percentile -10th percentile B: 50th percentile -10th percentile B: 50th percentile -10th percentile B: 50th percentile -10th percentile B: 50th percentile -10th percentile B: 50th percentile -10th percentile B: 50th percentile -10th percentile B: 50th percentile -10th percentile B: 50th percentile -10th percentile B: 50th percentile -10th percentile B: 50th percentile -10th percentile B: 50th percentile -10th percentile B: 50th percentile -10th percentile B: 50th percentile -10th percentile
d5010_S95 0.706  0.797  0.848  0.584  0.702  0.706  0.873  0.865  1.033  0.691  0.792  0.746 
d5010_S02 0.718  0.867  0.910  0.607  0.763  0.742  0.921  0.911  0.965  0.690  0.815  0.762 
d5010_S07 0.721  0.893  0.939  0.611  0.793  0.778  0.970  0.941  0.928  0.725  0.863  0.794 
C: 90th percentile -50th percentile C: 90th percentile -50th percentile C: 90th percentile -50th percentile C: 90th percentile -50th percentile C: 90th percentile -50th percentile C: 90th percentile -50th percentile C: 90th percentile -50th percentile C: 90th percentile -50th percentile C: 90th percentile -50th percentile C: 90th percentile -50th percentile C: 90th percentile -50th percentile C: 90th percentile -50th percentile C: 90th percentile -50th percentile C: 90th percentile -50th percentile C: 90th percentile -50th percentile C: 90th percentile -50th percentile
d9050_S95 0.602  0.667  0.796  0.498  0.565  0.656  0.629  0.779  0.757  0.511  0.619  0.742 
d9050_S02 0.686  0.684  0.837  0.532  0.569  0.655  0.719  0.787  0.830  0.573  0.632  0.728 
d9050_S07 0.749  0.702  0.871  0.528  0.585  0.658  0.742  0.813  0.877  0.633  0.640  0.718 
D: Variance of Log Wage D: Variance of Log Wage D: Variance of Log Wage D: Variance of Log Wage D: Variance of Log Wage D: Variance of Log Wage D: Variance of Log Wage D: Variance of Log Wage D: Variance of Log Wage D: Variance of Log Wage D: Variance of Log Wage D: Variance of Log Wage D: Variance of Log Wage D: Variance of Log Wage D: Variance of Log Wage D: Variance of Log Wage
var_S95 0.396  0.447  0.456  0.293  0.356  0.329  0.537  0.540  0.506  0.406  0.407  0.370 
var_S02 0.648  0.541  0.579  0.496  0.421  0.418  0.552  0.594  0.578  0.378  0.452  0.426 
var_S07 0.807  0.538  0.640  0.631  0.422  0.472  0.666  0.631  0.647  0.364  0.492  0.476 
E: Between-job Variance E: Between-job Variance E: Between-job Variance E: Between-job Variance E: Between-job Variance E: Between-job Variance E: Between-job Variance E: Between-job Variance E: Between-job Variance E: Between-job Variance E: Between-job Variance E: Between-job Variance E: Between-job Variance E: Between-job Variance E: Between-job Variance E: Between-job Variance
varxb_S95 0.054  0.104  0.085  0.026  0.054  0.035  0.078  0.149  0.129  0.035  0.073  0.041 
varxb_S02 0.263  0.125  0.132  0.179  0.067  0.053  0.155  0.159  0.132  0.067  0.077  0.047 
varxb_S07 0.280  0.106  0.126  0.183  0.060  0.054  0.340  0.159  0.135  0.112  0.084  0.054 
F: Within-job Variance F: Within-job Variance F: Within-job Variance F: Within-job Variance F: Within-job Variance F: Within-job Variance F: Within-job Variance F: Within-job Variance F: Within-job Variance F: Within-job Variance F: Within-job Variance F: Within-job Variance F: Within-job Variance F: Within-job Variance F: Within-job Variance F: Within-job Variance
varres_S95 0.341  0.343  0.371  0.266  0.301  0.294  0.459  0.391  0.377  0.371  0.334  0.329 
varres_S02 0.385  0.415  0.448  0.317  0.354  0.364  0.397  0.434  0.446  0.311  0.375  0.378 
varres_S07 0.527  0.432  0.515  0.449  0.363  0.418  0.326  0.472  0.512  0.252  0.408  0.422 
Note: Residual of Log  (wage) is obtained  by  first running regressions  of Log (wage) on schooling years, experience, experience squared,  sex, and 
province dummy variables, and then predicting wage residuals. P95, P02, and P07 denote skill prices of 1995, 2002, and 2007, respectively; whereas 
S95, S02, and S07 denote skill distribution of 1995, 2002, and 2007, respectively.
33